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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES, OFFICE OF
RECOVERY SERVICES,
PlaintiffRespondent,
v.

]
]
Case No, 860673

BETTY A. WHITAKER,
DefendantAppellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Throughout its responding brief, plaintiff maintains
that the administrative proceeding which was underway prior to
the filing of its complaint dealt solely with the issue of case
closure.

Thus, it declares:

a. The fair hearing officer's responsibility was to
make a decision whether the case closure was proper
under APA law and policy. Brief of Respondent, at
13;
b. The important point for this appeal is that the
administrative hearing officer is not reviewing
whether a debt in a sum certain is due and owing, but
merely whether closure of a public assistance case
was proper." Brief of Respondent, at 15; and
c. The fair hearing officer's decisions deal with
eligibility standards and case closure." Brief of
Respondent, at 19.
Plaintiff's assertions leave unanswered several
significant questions:

1. If the administrative proceeding was concerned solely with eligibility standards and proper
case closure, why was the Office of Recovery Services
(ORS), whose very name implies that it is in the
business of recovering overpayments, so heavily
involved in that administrative process?
2. Why did Mr. Terry Schow, an ORS investigator, send three separate notices to defendant concerning the overpayment during the latter months of
1984? (Appendix "1-1-3" of Appellant's Brief)
3. Why did Mr. Schow receive notice of defendant's September 17, 1985 hearing? (Attached as
Appendix "T")
4. Why did the ORS representative (Terry Schow)
appear at defendant's administrative hearing and
concede certain facts?
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "I", at
xxviii)
5. Why did Emma Chacon, ORS Bureau Director,
submit a "significant response to the Claimant's
Memorandum which could impact the outcome of this
case."? (Attached as Appendix "U")
6. Why did plaintiff's counsel, who represents
ORS on overpayments but who does not represent the
State of Utah on case closures, contact the Hearing
Examiner by letter dated December 13, 1985 concerning
defendant's pending administrative case? (Plaintiff's Exhibit "K", at xxxiii)
7. Why did plaintiff's counsel by letter dated
October 31, 1986 contact The Honorable Bill L.
Walker, Administrative Law Judge, in response to
defendant's appeal of the hearing decision? (Plaintiff's Exhibit "J", at xxxii)
The answer to these questions is clear:

ORS through

its representatives and legal counsel was involved at every
stage of the administrative proceeding for the sole purpose of

The relevant portion of the decision states: "The Office
of Recovery Services' representative considered this fact at
the hearing." Considering the context, the word intended was
probably "conceded."
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establishing and thereafter recovering an overpayment.

Its

involvement had nothing to do with a determination of eligibility or proper closure of plaintiff!s case; instead, its efforts
were directed toward a res judicata factual determination that
an overpayment existed which could then be used as a basis for
recovery through the judicial process or through the administrative procedures available under U.C.A. §55-15e-l e_t. seq.
Plaintiff makes further assertions concerning the
issue before the fair hearing officer which are not supported
by the record.

It states:

a. The fair hearing officer's responsibility was to
make a decision whether the case closure was proper
under APA law and policy. (Brief of Respondent, at
13; and
b. The fair hearing officer is not responsible to
adjudicate a specific overpayment debr. (Brief of
Respondent, at 14) (emphasis in the original)
However, when the fair hearing officer's decision is examined,
the opposite is true.

The Hearing Examiner speaks not of case

closure but of whether an overpayment was correctly computed.
Plaintiff's Exhibit "I", at xxv.

Pertinent portions of the

fair hearing officer's decision state:
a. NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED: That the decision
by the District I Office of Community Operations in
computing a Financial Food Stamp overpayment is
hereby sustained. (Plaintiff's Exhibit I, at xxv);
b. The claimant requested the hearing on December
26, 1984 to appeal a decision .... closing the
claimant's financial assistance case and subsequent
determination of an overpayment. (Plaintiff's Exhibit
I, at xxvi);
c. It is undisputed that the November and December,
1984 notices contained no explanation of the decision
for the overpayment determination. (Plaintiff's
Exhibit "I", at xxix);
- 3-

d. The Hearing Examiner, however, finds that the
claimant's overpayment is properly before the Hearing
Examiner, and he does have the right to review the
case based upon the facts. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "I",
at xxx)
e. The significant
Examiner is whether
existing based upon
tiff's Exhibit "I",

factual issue before the Hearing
or not there is an overpayment
the equity in the house. (Plainat xxx-xxxi); and

f. The decision by the District I Office of Community Operations in computing a Financial Food Stamp
overpayment is hereby sustained. The overpayment
should be classified as a factual error. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "I", at xxxi)
Nowhere in the Hearing Examiner's decision is there indication
that the sole purpose of the administrative proceeding was to
determine whether the case had been properly closed.

The

content of the administrative decision shows that the purpose
of the hearing was to establish whether an overpayment existed.
If it did, and if defendant took no further appeal of that
decision, ORS could have recovered the overpayment in several
ways:
a. Had defendant again become eligible for financial
assistance, the overpayment could have been recovered
through an allotment reduction;
b. ORS could have used the decision as a res
judicata factual determination for summary judgment
purposes in a judicial proceeding;
c. Since ORS had filed a notice of overpayment
determination under U.C.A. §55-15e, and since its
representative (Schow) apparently stipulated to
joinder of that action with the pending administrative proceeding, ORS could have arguably docketed
a judgment pursuant to the authority found at U.C.A.
§55-15e-8.
The factual determination at the administrative level had a
real importance to ORS in its recovery of an alleged overpayment.

Its participation at the administrative level evidences
- 4-

that.

Given this fact, plaintiff's argument that the adminis-

trative proceeding had no bearing on its filing of a complaint
in district court is without merit.
At page 16 of its brief, plaintiff argues that it hac
clear statutory authority to bring an independent action at the
same time the administrative case was pending.

If the authori-

ty to file an independent action was so clear, one must question why plaintiff's complaint does not reflect that clarity.
Instead of simply stating that it was demanding recovery of an
overpayment, plaintiff made an ambiguous reference in paragraph
4 of its complaint to jurisdiction based on U.C.A. §55-15a-25
which permits a trial de novo following the conclusion of an
administrative proceeding.

Plaintiff's ambiguous pleading is

relevant, since it evidences the fact that it did not consider
its complaint to be an independent action, but rather a hybrid
cause of action, sprung from its own imagination, by which it
might invoke the jurisdiction of the district court and thereby
obtain a prejudgment writ of attachment.

Plaintiff's rationale

that it had authority for an independent cause of action came
after the fact when its jurisdictional basis was challenged by
a motion to dismiss. While plaintiff's handiwork may be
imaginative, the resulting creation does violence to the
statute and tramples recklessly over established case law.
At several points in its brief, Plaintiff acknowledges the undesirable possibility of concurrent actions at the
administrative and judicial levels. Plaintiff blithely concludes that "common sense" will eliminate concurrent litigation
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of the same issue in both forums*
25

Brief of Respondent, at 11,

Plaintiff glosses over the fact that common sense did not

preclude concurrent actions in this case. Plaintiff further
ignores the fact that even as this case is pending before this
Court, the administrative decision in defendant's case is
pending on appeal before an administrative law judge. Theoretically, the ALJ could rule in defendant's favor. Alternatively, the same ALJ could uphold the administrative decision,
which would then trigger defendant's right to further review at
the judicial level. As defendant has argued in her opening
brief, adoption of plaintiff's legal argument could result in
actions proceeding in three separate forums. See Brief of
Appellant, at 16. Theoretically, all three proceedings could
end up at the district and appellate court levels.

It is such

judicial ineconomy that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was designed to prevent.
CONCLUSION
Administrative proceedings under U.C.A. §§55-15a and
55-15e are important means for the recovery of overpayments by
ORS.

Plaintiff has underscored the importance of such proceed-

ings by its involvement in defendant's case throughout the
administrative process.

Plaintiff's involvement belies its

facile assertion that the administrative process was solely for
the purpose of determining whether defendant's case was properly closed.

Under the relevant statutes and case law, an admin-

istrative procedure permitting alternative means for recovery
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of an overpayment cannot be maintained concurrently with a
judicial action*
Approval of plaintiff's interpretation of the statute
and case law will contribute to further confusion in the
recovery of overpayments and further burden the Utah judicial
system.

Such an undesirable result can be easily avoided by

application of the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies to this case.
DATED this

7 ^ day of

fjtA fu* f

1987.

MZTCHAEL E. BULSON "
Attorney for Appellant-Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct
copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Robert D.
Barclay, Attorney for Plaintiff, at Office of Recovery Services, 2540 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401, via first-class
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this 7~Q1 day of //• ^ cu 5 t
,
1987.
J

MICHAEL E. BULSON
Attorney for Appellant-Defendant
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Scott M Matheson Governor State of Utah
Norman G Angus Executive Director

Social Services
September 5, 1985
NOTICE OF HEARING

Claimant:

Betty Ann Whitaker
240 North 100 West
Brigham City, Utah 84302

Location:

District II (A) 0C0-APA Office
385 - 24th Street, Third Floor
Ogden, Utah 84401

Date and Time:

September 17, 1985
1:40 P.M.

Issues to be Considered:

Overpayment/Office of Recovery Services Notice,

You are directed to appear and to bring such witnesses and evidence as you
desire to present at that time. You may be represented by an attorney, and
you may question witnesses and examine evidence presented at the hearing.
If the time, date or location of the hearing is inconvenient, or if you wish
to withdraw your request for a hearing, please notify our office promptly in
order that the hearing may be rescheduled or canceled.
Sincerely,

Neal Bernson
Fair Hearing Officer

^

NB/ss
cc: Ctirtis L. Child
Kyle Snow
Julia Bosley
Elaine Gunnarson
Terry Schow
Don Knight
NOTE: CHANGE OF DATE, TIME AND LOCATION OF HEARING.
Office of Administrative Hearings

150 West North Temple Suite 353
PO Box 2500 Salt Lake City Utah 84110-2500
801 -533-7386 & 533-6586

J Steven Eklund Director

An Equal Opportunity Employer

APPENDIX T

Social Services
T 0:
From:
Subject:

Memorandum

Neal Bernson
Administrative Hearing Officer

Date:

October 21, 1985

Emma

Chacory^Bureau Director
Office of Recovery Services
Betty Ann Whi taker

Due to my anticipated maternity leave in the near future and the extent of the
Claimant's Memorandum filed in behalf of Betty Ann Whitaker by Mr. Curt
Chi Ids, I would like to request a continuance of the hearing and response time
for a period of 60 days. The Office of Recovery Services will have a
significant response to the Claimant's Memorandum which could impact the
outcome of this case.
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated,
comments, please contact me.

If you have any questions or

ELC/gt

cc: Brenda Hofer

Elaine Gunnarson

'%

DSS-30 12/77

An Equal Opportunity Employer
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